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Editors’ Choice
It isn’t unusual for organizational crises to stimulate organi-
zational theorizing, as a wide range of papers suggests (e.g., 
Antonacopoulou & Sheaffer, 2014; Kahn, Barton, & Fellows, 
2013; Kwon & Constantinides, 2018; Pearson & Clair, 1998; 
Rudolph & Repenning, 2002; Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2008). 
Especially with regard to crises, as organizational scholars 
we are used to looking outward, toward organizations to 
which we don’t belong, for our theoretical stimulation and 
our empirical data gathering. We are less used to looking 
inward, to our own scholarly associations. A crisis situation 
is more intimate when we are talking about something that 
has to do with us personally. Such events raise new chal-
lenges. However, as Anteby (2013) argues, at least when we 
are able to maintain some professional distance, familiarity 
with and care for a particular situation may enhance our 
scholarly engagement with it and our ability to study it.
Professor Anita McGahan’s actions as the President of the 
Academy of Management (AOM) at the time of EO13769, 
and the interactions she had with others, especially over social 
media, reflected a crisis. Her actions, which she took from a 
moral stance, stimulated considerable negative reaction from 
others, as is obvious in her article (McGahan, 2019).
The crisis she experienced is also very important intel-
lectually. It stimulated novel conceptual thinking, as is 
obvious from the responses to McGahan’s paper presented 
below.
The reflections in these papers suggest how the crisis 
McGahan experienced may be understood in terms of mul-
tiple conceptual perspectives that run the theoretical gamut 
from the quite micro to quite macro. They show how crises 
may stimulate scholarly thinking in ways that may be very 
fruitful theoretically, even if not at all in practice.
Although the reflections vary theoretically, virtually all of 
the papers point to dilemmas present in the events McGahan 
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Abstract
Organizational crises have often stimulated scholarly theorizing that has been productive for our field. Rarely, however, 
are there opportunities to theorize regarding crises that happen in our own professional associations. A crisis experienced 
by Professor Anita McGahan when she was the President of the Academy of Management, described in an accompanying 
article, has presented such an opportunity. In this set of nine brief reflections, several scholars have considered how 
McGahan’s actions with regard to that crisis can be understood conceptually and how they may stimulate development 
of previously established conceptual perspectives. These reflections make evident that McGahan’s actions cannot be 
appreciated without recognition of the complex dilemmas to which she was responding. These dilemmas include issues of 
trustworthy leadership, gendered power, leader voice, sensemaking and learning, organizational identities, psychological 
contracts, institutional leadership, and “good bureaucracy.”
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experienced and the responses she received that made it 
impossible for one action to be seen as universally accept-
able. A good deal of moralizing ignores dilemmas such as 
those she described, asserting largely that there is a particular 
stance someone should have taken (a stance that of course 
corresponds with what the moralizer wants). The responses 
eloquently show how misguided a stance like that is.
There are nine papers included. I will very briefly intro-
duce the questions or dilemmas addressed in each of them. 
Then I will turn the discussion over to the authors of the 
papers. The questions addressed are loosely grouped into 
somewhat micro, mezzo, and macro topics.
Three of the papers focus on the micro level. They raise 
questions about how the individual leader is perceived and 
what is missing in discussions of how the leader might act.
Kimberly Elsbach asks, Is making difficult decisions that 
others disagree with an immoral act or an illustration of com-
petency-based trustworthiness?
Emma Bell asks, If we view leadership as “a myth which 
functions as a social defense” that emerges in response to 
situations of uncertainty and ambiguity, are the “violent” 
responses of a minority a projection of anxiety and helpless-
ness onto a (female) leader?
Costas Markides asks, What in Hirschman’s exit, voice 
and loyalty model is missing when the person deciding 
which action to take is an organizational leader? How can 
organizational change be (successfully) initiated by a 
change agent who does not have the authority to impose 
change?
Three of the papers focus on a somewhat “mezzo” level. 
They raise questions about organization-level tensions and 
potential benefits of situations like that described by 
McGahan.
Marlys Christianson and Kathleen Sutcliffe ask, What 
may be the (perhaps paradoxical) benefits of crises for learn-
ing and sensemaking and organizational identity (OI)?
Michael Pratt asks, What is the role of the leader when 
there are hybrid or multiple views of “who we are?” as an 
organization? Where does OI properly reside?
Jacqueline Coyle-Shapiro asks, Given the perceptual 
nature of reciprocal obligations, how do organizations man-
age tensions between proffering ideological currency to 
those that value it and withholding it for those that it might 
offend?
Finally, three of the papers focus on a macro level. They 
consider the issues raised by McGahan from a more institu-
tional and bureaucratic perspective.
Mary Ann Glynn asks, If an institutional leader is the pri-
mary promoter and protector of institutional values, does that 
empower the leader to ignore or over-ride those values with-
out due institutional processes, even if there is a mis-align-
ment between the values of the leader and the institution?
William Ocasio asks, Does framing a political act as 
moral make the act any less political? What type of framing 
and acting on the part of an institutional leader most helps 
develop the leader’s organization as an institution infused 
with values and moral character?
Finally, Diane Burton and Marc Ventresca ask, Is the 
AOM presidency a platform for personal moral leadership 
and/or a professional office with a clearly specified role? 
Are the ethical attributes of a “good bureaucrat” moral or 
immoral?
As is evident, these are very important questions for our 
field to consider, not only in practice (as McGahan has dem-
onstrated) but also in theory. The papers follow below, in the 
order in which I have introduced them.
The AOM and the Travel Ban
Kimberly D. Elsbach
As I read Professor McGahan’s comments about EO13769, 
it brought to mind the issue of leader trustworthiness. 
Psychologists who study trustworthiness (e.g., Reeder, 
1993; Wojciszke, 2005) have proposed that this trait has 
two fundamental components (i.e., competency and moral-
ity), and that we use different processes in making attribu-
tions of these components. When making attributions of 
competency, they suggest that we consider situational con-
straints as potential excuses for incompetence (e.g., was 
the leader who made a poor strategic decision influenced 
by bad information?) and view incompetence as a tempo-
rary trait that can be changed over time (e.g., a leader can 
learn how to engage in better decision making). By con-
trast, when making attributions of morality, they suggest 
that we do not consider situational constraints (i.e., any 
immoral act is inexcusable, regardless of the situation), 
and we consider immorality to be a relatively permanent 
trait (i.e., immoral persons cannot become moral 
overnight).
It appears that McGahan’s critics were focusing on her 
morality-based trustworthiness in making her decision 
regarding the executive order. As a result, these critics have 
been very unforgiving of what they saw as an immoral act. 
But what if we viewed her act, instead, as signaling compe-
tency-based trustworthiness (i.e., her actions revealed her 
competency in fulfilling her role as AOM President)? If we 
take this view, her actions may be seen as constrained by her 
situation (e.g., she was constrained by AOM rules) and, even 
if she was deemed incompetent in interpreting those rules, 
her incompetence need not be seen as permanent, and audi-
ences may have allowed that she could learn from the experi-
ence. One might argue that this may be a more fitting 
perspective to take on McGahan’s trustworthiness, as criteria 
for evaluating the competence of AOM leaders are relatively 
clear (spelled out in the Constitution), whereas those for 
evaluating the morality of AOM leaders are contested and 
relatively unclear. This is an interesting issue for debate.
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Gendered Power and Leadership 
Agency
Emma Bell
Women leaders are subject to gendered scrutiny—of their 
actions and embodied practices—measured against a 
masculine stereotype of “good” leadership. They are also 
considered “less likable” even if their competence is per-
ceived to be equivalent to male colleague (Ibarra, Ely, & 
Kolb, 2013). Neither Tsoukas (2018) nor McGahan 
(2019) reflects on gender in their analyses of leadership, 
identity, and ethics in the AOM. As a feminist scholar, I 
seek to cultivate individual and collective discernment 
toward issues of gender and power by “taking a stand” 
against sexism, gendered inequality, and patriarchal 
oppression in organizations I encounter (Bell, Meriläinen, 
Taylor, & Tienari, 2019).
I focus here on two moments in these authors’ accounts 
where gendered power is an unexamined presence. The first 
concerns McGahan’s note about an AOM Governor who 
“remarked lightly that he believed it was the first in the his-
tory of the AOM in which every Executive Committee mem-
ber was a woman.” This observation, made in passing at a 
Board of Governors’ meeting, gives a clue as to the gendered 
power relations at play, including between McGahan and 
Tsoukas, as well as between other AOM members who 
voiced their opposition to the position taken by the AOM 
President via social media.
The second moment relates to the analogy drawn by 
Tsoukas (2018) between the AOM President’s handling of 
EO13769 and the moral duty of directors of Harvey 
Weinstein’s company to blow the whistle on his sexual pred-
atory habits to protect the human dignity of female employ-
ees. Tsoukas (2018) makes no mention of gender despite the 
clear link between these institutionalized practices and patri-
archal cultures. Although it is uncontentious to argue that the 
only ethical response in both cases is to “articulate. . . prin-
cipled opposition” (Tsoukas, 2018), the question we must 
ask ourselves is how are we to enact opposition ethically and 
toward whom is our opposition most effectively directed? 
This leads to a final point about what the authors mean by 
leadership.
McGahan and Tsoukas both imply a reified view by 
focusing on the “AOM leadership” and the “leadership 
agency” of the AOM President, thereby converting an 
abstract “mental construct into a supposed real entity.” 
However, if we view leadership as “a myth which functions 
as a social defense” that emerges in response to situations of 
uncertainty and ambiguity (Gemmill & Oakley, 1992, 
p. 114), then the “violent” responses of a minority may be 
read as the projection of anxiety and helplessness onto a 
(female) leader—a gendered collective response that reflects 
and encourages learned dependency.
Exit or Voice Are Not the Only Options
Costas Markides
In his classic treatise, Hirschman (1970) proposed that mem-
bers of an organization have essentially two possible 
responses when they grow dissatisfied with the quality of the 
benefits they receive from their organization—exit or voice. 
However, loyalty to the organization can affect the cost–ben-
efit analysis of whether to use exit or voice—the higher the 
loyalty of a member to the organization, the higher the prob-
ability of responding through voice (and the lower the prob-
ability of exit). Professor McGahan’s actions amply 
demonstrate this prediction. When challenged to quit the 
AOM, she provides a number of reasons why she did not 
choose this response (p. 21), all of which point to her desire 
to (attempt to) change the organization she loves for the bet-
ter—hence her choice of voice over exit.
However, whereas McGahan’s decision not to exit supports 
this prediction of the Hirschman model, the specific actions 
she took point to a contingency that is absent from Hirschman’s 
model—what happens if the organizational member is not just 
any member but is one of the leaders of the organization? This 
raises the possibility of another possible response option—
namely, the option of not only demanding change (through 
voice) but also taking tangible actions to change the organiza-
tion. It should be obvious from McGahan’s actions that this is 
a viable addition to the Hirschman model.
What’s more, the manner in which McGahan chose to 
introduce change points to a gap in the literature on change 
management. The majority of change models proposed in 
the literature take the perspective of the leader who utilizes 
her position in the hierarchy to galvanize the organization 
into action through a variety of means (e.g., Beer & Nohria, 
2000; Kotter, 2012). But how can you introduce change 
when you are a middle-level manager or a top-level man-
ager in a “democratic” organization where you have limited 
resources and you are facing seemingly insurmountable 
organizational constraints—a situation that McGahan was 
facing at the AOM? Her actions suggest that in situations 
such as these, we require a different change process—not a 
top-down process driven by one heroic individual but a bot-
toms-up, decentralized process, driven by the efforts of 
numerous individuals in the organization. The role of the 
leader, therefore, is not to push change through but to design 
a system that pulls multiple agents into the effort and to 
orchestrate their actions so that the collection of many seem-
ingly small initiatives leads to major change. This is a far 
different view of what leaders do to introduce change—one 
that sees leaders as designers and orchestrators rather than 
as commanders-in-chief. McGahan’s actions and success in 
driving change at the AOM suggest that this model of 
change is not only viable but possibly the best way to change 
the types of organizations we have in today’s world.
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Learning Through EO13769
Marlys G. Christianson and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe
Professor McGahan’s case study of her response to EO13769 
as the President of the AOM highlights issues of moral 
responsibility, leadership, governance, organizational 
change, and strategy. From our perspective as sensemaking 
scholars, she also sheds light on crises as occasions for sen-
semaking and learning. It’s rare to have a firsthand account 
of leader sensemaking during crisis and rarer still for the 
author to be an organizational scholar (cf. Gioia, 1992). 
McGahan (2019) illustrates how crisis can trigger learning 
that spans levels of analysis and unfolds over time.
The precipitating event in a crisis can lead to a surge of 
meaning that can be overwhelming and take time to process 
(Roux-Dufort, 2007). As the leadership and membership of 
AOM confronted what EO13769 meant in the context of the 
organization’s policy of no political speech, there were many 
different interpretations of the event and how it should be 
responded to. Leaders are often portrayed as active sense-
making guides, but in some contexts sensemaking is not so 
neat or tidy. Sensemaking is fragmented; it involves other 
stakeholders who raise issues, produce their own accounts, 
and propose myriad solutions (Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014). Leaders face many challenges as they manage a cri-
sis; beyond their own sensemaking about the event and its 
implications, they also have to make sense of other people’s 
responses to the event.
Crises can be brutal audits that reveal organizational 
weaknesses (Lagadec, 1993). Paradoxically, crisis can also 
reveal organizational strengths, trigger learning, and poten-
tially lead to a shift in OI (Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & 
Weick, 2009). EO13769 revealed both weaknesses and 
strengths. Responding to this crisis required that AOM lead-
ership addresses the immediate situation as well as makes 
long-term changes to bolster the organization so that it would 
be more resilient to future attacks. Organizational learning 
was instantiated in changes in the organization’s response 
repertoire, specifically the rules governing permitted speech 
on behalf of AOM. This crisis prompted significant discus-
sion about the role of the Academy. The variety of reflections 
on the event and how it was handled, the making and remak-
ing of sense over time itself has provided additional loci of 
learning from this crisis. In this way, perhaps the AOM has 
learned more about learning itself (Christianson et al., 2009).
Multiple Identities and Leadership
Michael G. Pratt
In the spirit of the article’s intent to spur additional discus-
sion and analysis, I look at the issues raised here in terms of 
identity. McGahan’s (2019) case is initially framed as a con-
flict between a leader identity and an organizational one. She 
frames AOM’s OI as singular and tied to its constitution, its 
NPSP policy, as well as to its other principles. But in articu-
lating the case, she does not view herself solely as a leader 
(role identity): She is also a moral person (personal identity) 
who is both a scholar and a citizen (both role and social iden-
tities). Articulated in this way, the case raises several inter-
esting questions for how to look at identities—both 
organizational and individual—and leadership.
As a moral person who strongly identifies with the AOM 
(particularly in her role identity as president), EO13769 
threatened more than one of her identities. However, if she 
did not see the NPSP as central to AOM’s OI, and her role as 
the President of the AOM as central to who she was, she may 
have responded to EO13769 differently. She may have done 
what her personal identity, and not what her role identity, was 
telling her to do. Thus, we might ask, “How strongly do we 
want our leaders to identify with their roles, and if and when 
might we want a leader’s personal identity to take precedent 
over an organizational one?”1 The case also begs the ques-
tion, “Where does OI reside?” Here, AOM’s OI is viewed as 
inherent in the Constitution and organizational values. But 
OI can also be viewed as socially constructed. Would another 
leader have viewed AOM’s identity differently? Did the sen-
semaking of the executive board influence how OI was 
framed? Would the NPSP be seen as central without this con-
flict, and how does social context frame how OI is framed 
and viewed? How does a monolithic view of OI square with 
research that argues that organizations can have two or more, 
potentially conflicting, OIs? What is the role of the leader 
when there are hybrid or multiple views of “who we are?” 
These questions are important for managing pluralistic orga-
nizations that value diversity. They are also important for 
figuring out how to change OI(s). Even if framed as a first 
step, what impact does changing a policy have on an organi-
zation’s identity?
Ideological Currencies as a Crucial 
Dimension of Psychological Contracts
Jacqueline A.-M. Coyle-Shapiro
Psychological contract theory has historically emphasized 
transactional and relational currencies—organizations 
deliver on pay and career development, and their members 
deliver on performance in exchange. A third currency—ideo-
logical—has been less frequently studied and thought to 
apply in only limited circumstances (organizations with a 
valued social cause and for volunteers). The AOM case study 
highlights the importance of ideological currency in any 
organization, alongside the traditional transactional and rela-
tional elements.
The reaction of some members to the lack of visible and 
immediate response to the Executive Order suggests that the 
Academy violated a perceived ideological obligation to 
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contribute to “a cause” (condemnation of the action of a 
political leader that infringes upon scientific freedom). In the 
words of Professor McGahan, “we need to double down on 
scholarship” (2018, p. 175) and address when, why, and how 
organizations signal that they are exchanging ideological 
currency?
Are these obligations “promissory” in nature and when 
might the boundaries become fuzzy between ideological 
reciprocal obligations and universal (non-reciprocal) obliga-
tions? What behaviors are manifested in employees fulfilling 
their ideological obligations? Given the perceptual nature of 
reciprocal obligations, how do organizations manage the ten-
sion between proffering of ideological currency to those that 
value it and withholding it for those that it might offend? In 
the case of a professional association such as the Academy 
that is governed by volunteers, how can it manage the ideo-
logically driven expectations of a global and diverse member 
base without fractionalization?
Principled Institutionalism
Mary Ann Glynn
Institutions, despite their durability and potency, are fragile 
social constructions, in need of ongoing maintenance. A crit-
ical force in maintaining an institution’s integrity, upholding 
its core values, sustaining its survival and avoiding drift or 
opportunism, is that of the leader, chief executive or, as 
Selznick (1957) puts it: the statesman.2
Selznick, an early institutional theorist in the field of man-
agement scholarship, is renowned for his oft-cited observa-
tion that “to institutionalize [an organization] is to infuse with 
value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” 
(p. 17). The task for this falls largely to the institutional leader 
who becomes the primary promoter and protector of institu-
tional values (p. 28). However, Selznick clearly emphasizes 
that this does not empower a leader to ignore, over-ride, or 
abruptly change those values without due institutional pro-
cesses and appropriate governance systems, even if there is a 
mis-alignment between the values of the leader and the insti-
tution. On this, Selznick (p. 27) is quite explicit. He writes 
that the institutional leader is emphatically not “free to do as 
he wishes, to mold the organization according to his heart’s 
desire, restrained only by the quality of his imagination and 
the strength of his will.” Clearly, the institution should not 
unreflectively mirror a leader’s values or imagination; to do 
so would threaten institutional integrity, making it vulnerable 
to the whims of the leader of the moment. Rather, the burden 
of institutional leadership is to defend the institutional values 
and character, regardless of one’s personal proclivities. This, 
in effect, is a description of Professor McGahan’s leadership; 
it was principled institutionalism.
I served as AOM’s President-Elect while Professor 
McGahan was President (August 2016–August 2017). I can 
affirm the veracity of her accounts of key events and her 
leadership, as she relates them in her accompanying paper. 
As she passed the mantle of leadership to me, I asked her 
what was the most important thing for me to remember in 
this role. Professor McGahan’s response was simple, pro-
found, and invaluable: Always try to do what’s best for the 
Academy. This was clearly her guiding principle. And it 
resonates strongly with Selznick’s view of institutional 
leadership, that of maintaining the fidelity and commitment 
to the institution’s values and purpose. And yet, leaders do 
need to be responsive to external constituencies and shift-
ing societal values. It is a dilemma that every institutional 
leader faces, she acknowledges: “Were I to condemn the 
NPSP in the name of the organization, I would be imposing 
my identity onto that of the organization in a way that the 
organization explicitly prohibited.” The result would have 
been to threaten AOM and threaten both the legitimacy of 
the leader and the integrity of the institution. Rather, using 
AOM’s policy and principles as guard rails, Professor 
McGahan effected change from within the institution. And 
for that, she upheld its integrity. I, as an AOM member, am 
grateful that she did.
Moral Leadership as a Political Act
William Ocasio
Moral leadership is a political act. Moral values are not uni-
versal truths and subject to political contestation over their 
applicability and interpretation. Selznick’s (1957) Leadership 
in Administration is not only an enduring classic in organiza-
tion theory but remains a practical and living guide to evalu-
ate the politics of moral leadership, not only in theory but 
also in practice. The controversy over the AOM handling of 
EO13769 illustrates these political dilemmas vividly, with 
Professor McGahan, President of AOM, in the role of institu-
tional leader. Tsoukas (2018) accuses her of lack of moral 
imagination. McGahan (2019) defends herself.
In a way, evaluating the controversy is simple. Is the 
travel ban a political act, and if McGahan had framed AOM’s 
response as “moral” rather than “political” would it have 
made it any less political? AOM is a membership organiza-
tion, which probably leans liberal and anti-Trump, but con-
tains supporters and admirers of Trump and his immigration 
policies. So, of course, it’s a political issue. Reframing it as 
“moral” instead would have been a political act by McGahan 
imposing her own moral and political beliefs on an institu-
tion where some member’s views differ from McGahan’s or 
Tsoukas’s (2018).
A more complex evaluation considers whether morality 
trumps politics and when and whether a leader should take 
moral stances that may do so. Here, Selznick offers a 
guide. First, the President of AOM is, or should be, an 
institutional leader, charged with enforcing, interpreting, 
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and developing AOM as an institution infused with values 
and moral character. Critical events, such as EO13769, are 
where values get questioned, reinforced, or transformed. I 
agree with Tsoukas (2018) that the travel ban was immoral, 
but I respect others who may disagree. In my judgment, 
democracy, for AOM, is a value that requires institutional 
leaders to defend it. McGahan’s concerns for the AOM 
Constitution was and is paramount. Ironically, she could 
be criticized from the right, and apparently has been, for 
following constitutional means to take a moral and inher-
ently political stance. In doing so, she followed the major-
ity view of AOM members. In my understanding of 
Selznick, her nuanced stance embodies the role of institu-
tional leadership in fostering AOM values. She should be 
commended, not criticized.
The Controversy Over the Response to 
the Travel Ban From a Weberian Lens
M. Diane Burton and Marc J. Ventresca
As organizational sociologists, we understand the critique 
posed by Tsoukas (2018) and the response offered by 
McGahan (2019) as a disagreement over the basis for legiti-
mate authority to act by the President of the AOM.
Students of organizational sociology engage directly and 
diversely as a starting point with the work of Max Weber, a 
founder of the field and preeminent theorist of bureaucracy 
and authority. Weber, analyzing and interpreting the legacy 
of the second industrial revolution and late 19th-century 
modernity, focused on the emergence of western-style capi-
talism and developed a set of analytical tools and definitions 
to explain the features of modern organizations.
In Economy and Society, Weber (1922/1968) drew atten-
tion to the mechanisms of power and domination by which 
rulers secure the compliance of the ruled and defined three 
alternative bases of legitimate authority—traditional, char-
ismatic, and legal-rational. Traditional authority rests on 
belief in the sanctity of established orders and received wis-
dom, broadly understood as a “pre-modern” form of legiti-
macy. Charismatic authority relies on devotion to an 
extraordinary individual person and figures in times of crisis 
or transitions to new rules. Legal-rational authority depends 
on beliefs in the (procedural) formalism of enacted rules.
Weber understood legal-rational authority as foundational 
to modern bureaucracy and in turn central to aspirations for 
stable governance. He further argued that bureaucracy was 
both efficient (relative to alternatives) and a stable way to 
organize social activity. Under conditions of legal-rational 
bureaucracy, leaders and all actors in a formal organization, 
a restricted category of a social system, must abide by the 
established rules or undertake a bureaucratic process to 
change the rules. (For a detailed discussion of domination 
and bureaucracy, see Swedberg (1998).) An essential feature 
of bureaucracy is the separation of the individual person 
from the office that he or she occupies. People can come and 
go, but the office has a set of recognized routines and respon-
sibilities that must be enacted—regardless of incumbent. 
Weber further specified other features of ideal-type bureau-
cracies including hierarchy, expertise, compensation, written 
documents, and rules which cover a fixed area of activity and 
focus “inside” an existing social order.
Reframing the current controversy through a Weberian 
lens, the questions become, Should the AOM president rely 
on traditional authority, charismatic authority or a legal-
rational authority for official actions? Is the AOM presidency 
a platform for personal moral leadership or a professional 
office with a clearly specified role?
Over the century of debates and extensions to core argu-
ments about legitimate authority and domination, three fur-
ther analytic considerations emerge to enrich the Weberian 
traditions: That organizations are open systems (Thompson, 
1967), full of conflicts and routines (Follett, 1927; March, 
1962); that leaders manage complex internal and external 
stakeholders in the service of preserving precarious values 
(Selznick, 1957); and that bureaucracy itself can enable 
action in supple ways (Adler, 2012; Burton, 2001). Reading 
through these insights, we see in this case a profound dis-
agreement over whether priority actions for a leader should 
be (a) preserving the apparatus of the organization to secure 
its long-term goals or (b) responding directly to current con-
text (Etzioni, 1960).
An organization sociological approach to framing and 
answering these questions starts from an analysis of the 
AOM as a complex organization forwarding a set of goals for 
management researchers and teachers. Scott and Davis 
(2016) describe in their canonical text that organizations are 
“social structures created by individuals to support the col-
laborative pursuit of specified goals” (p. 11). How do the 
stated goals and purposes of the organization influence leader 
action? How do the structural characteristics of the organiza-
tion enable or constrain a leader’s ability to act?
In the context of these debates regarding the AOM leader-
ship, the question becomes a study in whether the president 
should prioritize organizational persistence and functioning 
institutional rules and in how to take actions that recognize 
the current context and also reconcile with the longer term. 
As legacy Weberians, we note that the AOM relies on the 
voluntary efforts of temporary leaders. We point to du Gay’s 
(2000) observation that “the ethical attributes of the ‘good’ 
bureaucrat—adherence to procedure, acceptance of sub- and 
super-ordination, commitment to the purposes of the office 
. . . should be regarded as a positive moral and ethical 
achievement in their own right” (p. 4).
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Notes
1. Perhaps ironically, prioritizing personal over the collective 
identity is one of the critiques of how EO13769 came about 
in the first place. However, the veracity of that critique would 
likely depend on your political perspective—and I would point 
to Haidt’s (2012) work for another interpretation of this con-
flict. Rather than viewing her as lacking moral leadership—as 
her critics have suggested—it may be a case of different moral 
bases colliding.
2. Writing more than a half-century ago, Selznick (1957) used 
the male pronoun to describe the leader or statesman. Clearly, 
leaders are not restricted to a single gender but, to illuminate 
Selznick’s points, I retain his original language.
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